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ARTICLES
Material Participation Under Section
2032A: It Didn't Save the Family Farm
But it Sure Got Me Tenure*
Martin D. Begleiter**
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976,1 Congress added section 2032A
to the Internal Revenue Code (Code).' This was done in response to
perceived problems in passing family farms to the succeeding gener-
ation due to the burden of estate taxes. The statute is complex and
contains a number of tests. Professor Neil Harl, an expert on agri-
cultural law and economics, stated that, "Special use valuation is on
its way to becoming the most complex section in the entire Internal
Revenue Code."' I have explored the statute and the problems it has
* Copyright 0 1989 by Martin D. Begleiter. All rights reserved. This is the fourth article
I have written on this subject, in addition to lecturing on § 2032A and serving as the Vice-
Chair and Chair of the Task Force on Special Use Valuation of the ABA Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law. In a very real sense, I believe that my work on special use
valuation has been greatly responsible for my achieving tenure.
** Richard M. and Anita Clakins Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake University Law
School. B.A. 1967, University of Rochester; J.D. 1970, Cornell University. The author wishes
to express his appreciation to Cheryl M. Gill, Drake University Law School Class of 1989, for
her valuable assistance in the research and preparation of this Article. The author also grate-
fully acknowledges the assistance of the Board of Governors of the Drake University Law
School Endowment Trust and Dean David S. Walker of Drake University Law School for the
award of a Drake Law School Endowment Trust Research Stipend which greatly aided the
preparation of this Article.
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Tax Reform Act of 1976].
2. All references to the Internal Revenue Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended, unless the context otherwise requires.
3. For a discussion of this problem, see Begleiter, Section 2032A: Did We Save the
Family Farm, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 15, 17-25 (1979).
4. Harl, Special Use Valuation: The Complexitites of Economic Engineering, 60 N.D.L.
REV. 7, 43 (1984).
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created in a series of articles, and concluded that the enactment of
section 2032A has failed to save the family farm.5 This is not, how-
ever, to deny its importance in individual cases.
Originally, many believed that the major problem of interpreta-
tion of the statute would involve the material participation require-
ment, one test Congress used to limit the relief provided by the stat-
ute to family farms.6 However, due to some unanticipated
regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under the
qualified use test,7 the problems of material participation were subli-
mated to the qualified use requirement.
Nevertheless, in recent years a number of cases have discussed
the material participation standard. Although no final resolution of
the standard to be used for material participation has developed, the
cases so far decided permit analysis of the test likely to be adopted.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze these cases in an attempt to
determine the standard that will ultimately emerge for determining
qualification for special use valuation. Before this analysis is at-
tempted, the background of section 2032A must be discussed, since
the congressional purpose in enacting section 2032A is crucial in the
analysis of the cases involving material participation. Also necessary
is a discussion of how material participation is interpreted in section
1402 of the Code and section 211 of the Social Security Act.8
5. Begleiter, supra note 3; Begleiter, Section 2032A: Did We Really Save the Family
Farm, 5 NOTRE DAME EST. PLAN. INST. 929 (1980) [hereinafter Really]; Begleiter, Special
Use Valuation Nine Years Later: A Farewell to Farms, 63 TAXES 659 (1985) [hereinafter
Farewell to Farms].
6. Begleiter, supra note 3, at 37-38.
7. The qualified use test provides that in order to qualify for special use valuation, real
property must be used as a farm for farming purposes. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(2). In regulations,
ironically issued under the rubric of explaining material participation, the IRS required that in
order to satisfy the qualified use test the real property had to be used in an active trade or
business and that the decedent or a member of his family (and after the decedent's death, the
qualified heir) must own an equity interest in the farm operation and be "at risk" in the farm
operation. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(b)(l) (1986). Qualified use will not be further discussed
in this Article. For a discussion of the problems caused by the regulations, see Farewell to
Farms, supra note 5, at 667-72.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 411 (1982). The focus of this Article is on the standard used to interpret
material participation. Therefore, a number of other issues in material participation will not be
discussed. For example, no attempt will be made to analyze material participation as applied
to trusts, corporations, and partnerships. Nor will the requirement of payment of the self-
employment tax to qualify for special use valuation be extensively treated. Finally, neither the
special test available for decedents who were continuously disabled or receiving old-age bene-
fits prior to death, nor the alternative of active management available in certain cases, will be
discussed. For a discussion of these issues, see Farewell to Farms, supra note 5, at 678-83.
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I. Background of Section 2032A
A. The Congressional Purpose9
Section 2032A was enacted to preserve the family farm from
forced sale to pay estate taxes." This perceived threat to the family
farm was caused primarily by three factors:
1. The increase in the value of farmland, the increased size of
farms necessary for viability, and the low rate of return on agricul-
tural assets;1 '
2. The requirement that land be valued at its highest and best
use for federal estate tax purposes; 2 and
3. The lack of liquid assets in the estates of most farmers. 8
Congress intended section 2032A, however, to benefit only family
farms. Many statements on the floor of Congress during the debate
over section 2032A witness this limitation. Perhaps the best of these
orations was given by Senator Gaylord Nelson:
On a strictly economic level, family farms and businesses
have proven to be the most efficient producers of food, shelter,
and many other basic and convenience goods and services that
can be found anywhere in the world.
The bonus to our society is that what these successful entre-
preneurs do for the towns and cities that prospered them.
For 200 years in this country we have had a system where
farms and businesses could be passed along from one generation
to another. These enterprises put down roots in their communi-
ties. Their owners come to care about their employees, their cus-
tomers, their churches, schools and hospitals. They work in local
charities and clubs and are the cement of community life.
Thomas Jefferson perceived this two centuries ago at the
time of the Revolution when he wrote about the value of the
independent freeholder with a stake in society. In this our Bicen-
tennial Year, death levies are threatening to destroy this system
by taxing it out of existence.
In my view, the preservation of small family enterprises,
which embody so many of the basic traditional values of this
country, is an adequate reason for distinguishing in the estate
9. For a more extensive analysis of the problems of farmers prior to 1976 and the hear-
ings on § 2032A, see Begleiter, supra note 3, at 17-26.
10. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1976) [hereinafter HousE
REPORT].
H1. Begleiter, supra note 3, at 18.
12. Id. at 19.
13. Id. at 21.
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tax laws between our most productive citizens and those whom
the law might allow, even encourage, to be completely
unproductive.14
Congress responded to the concern over the future of family
farms by enacting section 2032A. The congressional purpose was not
only to provide relief for a class of estates facing severe liquidity
problems, but to minimize the possibility that farmland would be
removed from agricultural production and from family ownership.
However, the many requirements Congress imposed on qualification
for special use valuation, as described in the House Report, show the
limits of the relief granted.Y5
B. Structure of the Statute
If the requirements of section 2032A are met, real property
used in a farm for farming purposes is valued for estate tax purposes
at its value as a farm or business.1 6 The requirements for qualifica-
tion are:1
7
14. 122 CONG. REC. 25944 (1976).
15. The qualification requirements are listed in Section I.B. of this Article. The House
Report states:
Your Committee believes that, when land is actually used for farming pur-
poses or in other closely held business (both before and after the decedent's
death), it is inappropriate to value the land on the basis of the potential "highest
and best use" especially since it is desirable to encourage the continued use of
property for farming and other small business purposes. Valuation on the basis
of highest and best use, rather than actual use, may result in the imposition of
substantially higher estate taxes. In some cases, the greater estate tax burden
makes continuation of farming, or the closely held business activities, not feasi-
ble because the income potential from these activities is insufficient to service
extended tax payments or loans obtained to pay the tax. Thus, the heirs may be
forced to sell the land for development purposes. Also, where the valuation of
land reflects speculation to such a degree that the price of the land does not bear
a reasonable relationship to its earning capacity, your committee believes it un-
reasonable to require that this "speculative value" be included in an estate with
respect to land devoted to farming or closely held businesses.
However, your committee recognizes that it would be a windfall to the ben-
eficiaries of an estate to allow real property used for farming or closely held
business purposes to be valued for estate tax purposes at its farm or business
value unless the beneficiaries continue to use the property for farm or business
purposes, at least for a reasonable period of time after the decedent's death.
Also, your committee believes that it would be inequitable to discount specula-
tive values if the heirs of the decedent realize these speculative values by selling
the property within a short time after the decedent's death.
For these reasons, your committee has provided for special use valuation in
situations involving real property used in farming or in certain other trades and
businesses, but it has further provided for recapture of the estate tax benefit
where the land is prematurely sold or is converted to nonqualifying uses.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 21-22.
16. I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(l), (b)(2)(A).
17. For a more complete discussion of the requirements, see Begleiter, supra note 3;
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1. The decedent was a United States citizen or resident at the
time of his death; 8
2. The executor must elect to have the section applied, furnish
certain information, and file an agreement signed by all qualified
heirs consenting to the recapture provisions; 9
3. The real property must be located in the United States;2"
4. The property must have been used for a qualified use on the
date of the decedent's death;2'
5. Fifty percent or more of the value of the gross estate must
consist of the adjusted value of real or personal property which, at
the decedent's death, was used for a qualified use;
6. Twenty-five percent or more of the adjusted value of the
gross estate must consist of the adjusted value of real property which
was being used for a qualified use on the date of the decedent's
death;2"
7. The real property must be acquired from or have passed from
the decedent to a qualified heir;24 and
8. For five or more years during the eight year period ending on
the date of decedent's death (a) the real property must have been
owned by the decedent or a member of his family and used for a
qualified use, and (b) the decedent or a member of his family must
have materially participated in the operation of the farm or other
business.25
In addition, the statute has a recapture provision that is acti-
vated under certain conditions. If, within ten years of the date of the
decedent's death and before the death of the qualified heir, the quali-
fied heir disposes of his interest in the qualified real property (other
than by disposition to a member of the qualified heir's family), or
ceases to use the property for the qualified use, an additional estate
tax (or recapture tax) is imposed in order to recapture the savings
made possible by special use valuation.2" One method of ceasing to
Really, supra note 5; Farewell to Farms, supra note 5.
18. I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(1)(A).
19. I.R.C. § 2032A(a)(l)(b), (d)(1), (d)(2).
20. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(l).
21. Id. A qualified use is defined as a farm for farming purposes or a trade or business
other than farming. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(2), (b)(2)(B). For the definitions of farm and farming
purposes, see I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(4), (e)(5).
22. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(A).
23. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(l)(B).
24. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(l)(A)(ii), (b)(l)(B). For the definitions of qualified heir and
member of the family, see I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(l), (e)(2).
25. IR.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C).
26. I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(1). For a more extended treatment of the problems of the recap-
ture tax, see Begleiter, supra note 3, at 65-71 and Farewell to Farms, supra note 5, at 683-91.
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use the property for the qualified use is if, during any eight year
period ending after the decedent's death, there are periods aggregat-
ing three years or more during which the decedent or a member of
his family (before the decedent's death) or the qualified heir or a
member of his family (after the decedent's death) failed to materi-
ally participate in the operation of the farm or the business." Mate-
rial participation is, therefore, important both before and after the
decedent's death.
C. The Statutory Definition
Section 2032A(e)(6) provides: "Material participation shall be
determined in a manner similar to the manner used for purposes of
paragraph (1) of section 1402(a) (relating to net earnings from self-
employment). '2 8 The legislative history does not elaborate on this
definition. Therefore, we must turn our attention to Code section
1402(a).
II. Code Section 1402(a)
Code section 1402(a) defines net earnings from self-employment
for the purpose of imposing the tax on self-employment income. 9 In
general, self-employment income means any income derived from a
trade or business. 30 However, rental income from real estate is ex-
cluded from the definition unless the rental income is derived from
an arrangement with the tenant which "provides . ..that there
shall be material participation by the owner . ..in the production
or the management of the production" in the agricultural commodi-
ties produced and such material participation actually takes place.3"
Thus, if the lease provides for material participation by the owner
and the material participation actually occurs, the rental income de-
rived is included in the owner's self-employment income and is sub-
ject to tax.
The regulations under section 1402(a) elaborate on the defini-
tion of material participation. Both an arrangement. providing for
material participation and actual material participation in the pro-
duction or the management of production are required. 2 Services
27. l.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7)(B).
28. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
29. I.R.C. § 1401 imposes a tax on self-employment income and prescribes the rates.
30. I.R.C. § 1402(a).
31. IR.C. § 1402(a)(1).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(1) (1986).
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performed by an employee or agent are excluded for this purpose."3
Thus, the test for material participation will focus on the meaning of
production and management of production.
A. Production
Production is composed of two major elements: physical work
and the furnishing of resources."' Although physical work alone may
constitute material participation, the regulation provides that the
furnishing of materials and being responsible for expenses alone can-
not.3 5 The furnishing of resources and expenses becomes important
in cases when the physical work does not rise to the level of material
participation. 6
B. Management of Production
Management of production is a term employed primarily to re-
fer to the responsibility for and the actual making of decisions, and
other activities affecting the production of a commodity.37 The regu-
lations list a number of decisions that will be taken into account.3"
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(5) (1986).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(ii) (1986) provides:
The term "production", wherever used in this paragraph, refers to the physical
work performed and the expenses incurred in producing a commodity. It in-
cludes such activities as the actual work of planting, cultivating, and harvesting
crops, and the furnishing of machinery, implements, seed, and livestock. An ar-
rangement will be treated as contemplating that the owner or tenant will materi-
ally participate in the "production" of the commodities required to be produced
by the other person under the arrangement if under the arrangement it is under-
stood that the owner or tenant is to engage to a material degree in the physical
work related to the production of such commodities. The mere undertaking to
furnish machinery, implements, and livestock and to incur expenses is not, in
and of itself, sufficient. Such factors may be significant, however, in cases where
the degree of physical work intended of the owner or tenant is not material. For
example, if under the arrangement it is understood that the owner or tenant is to
engage periodically in physical work to a degree which is not material in and of
itself and, in addition, to furnish a substantial portion of the machinery, imple-
ments, and livestock to be used in the production of the commodities or to fur-
nish or advance funds or assume financial responsibility for a substantial part of
the expense involved in the production of the commodities, the arrangement will
be treated as contemplating material participation in the production of such
commodities.
35. This part of the regulation, however, has been rejected in dictum. Henderson v.
Flemming, 283 F.2d 882, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1960).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(ii) (1986).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(iii) (1986).
38. These decisions and activities are:
I. "[W]hen to plant, cultivate, dust, spray, or harvest the crop";
2. "[Mlaking inspections of the production activities";
3. "[A]dvising and consulting";
4. "[M]aking decisions as to matters such as rotation of crops, the type of
crops to be grown, the type of livestock to be raised, and the type of machinery
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The regulations single out as particularly important making inspec-
tions of the production activities and advising and consulting with
the actual producer, which together will create a "strong inference"
of material participation. 9 Selecting the crops, machinery, or imple-
ments and deciding on crop rotation are downplayed, but may be-
come significant in the overall determination of material
participation."
C. Cases Under Section 1402(a)
There is no significant case law on material participation under
Code section 1402(a)(1) to aid in the determination of the standard
to be employed under section 2032A. Therefore, other sources must
be examined for interpretation of production and management of
production.
III. Social Security Act Section 211(a)(1)
A. The Statute and Regulations
Code section 1402(a) and the regulations thereunder are
designed to determine what earnings are included in the tax base
used to finance the federal Old Age and Survivor Trust Fund, which
was created to provide benefits primarily to the aged and disabled
and the survivors of such persons who received benefits during their
lives."1 In order to receive distributions from the fund, the recipient
(or, in the case of survivor benefits, the deceased) must have contrib-
uted to the fund (through deductions from wages (FICA) or the tax
on self-employment income).' 2 Though there is very little case law
on what constitutes material participation on the collection side of
social security (section 1402 of the Code), the statute governing dis-
tribution of the benefits financed by FICA and the tax on self-em-
ployment earnings contains provisions that correspond almost exactly
to Code section 1402(a)(1).
Section 211(a)(1) of the Social Security Act' 3 tracks the lan-
guage of section 1402(a)(1) of the Code, including the material par-
ticipation test. Moreover, before the Social Security Act regulations
and implements to be furnished."
Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(iii) (1986).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1983).
42. Id. § 401(h).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1983).
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were rewritten in 1980 to translate them from legalese into English,
the regulations were almost exactly the same as those under section
1402(a)(1) of the Code."" The current regulations under the Social
Security Act, though written in simpler terms than the treasury reg-
ulations, nevertheless contain the same explanation and tests of ma-
terial participation: both require an arrangement for and actual ma-
terial participation and both require participation in either
production or the management of production."5 A number of cases
have involved the question of what activities constitute material par-
ticipation under the Social Security Act. These cases are informative
as to the standard to be used to determine material participation.
B. The Case Law
The existence of material participation "is a factual determina-
44. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1053 (1979), especially subsections (c)(3) and (4).
45. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1082(c) (1979). Subsections (1)-(3) provide:
(c) Special rule for farm rental income.-( 1) In general. If you own or lease
land, any income you derive from it is included in figuring your net earnings
from self-employment if-
(i) The income results from an arrangement between you and another per-
son which provides for the other person to produce agricultural or horticultural
commodities on the land that you own or lease and for you to materially partici-
pate in the production or the management of the production of the agricultural
or horticultural commodities; and
(ii) You actually do materially participate.
(2) Nature of arrangement. (i) The arrangement between you and the other
person may be either oral or written. It must provide that the other person will
produce one or more agricultural or horticultural commodities and that you will
materially participate in the production or the management of the production of
the commodities.
(ii) The term "production," refers to the physical work performed and the
expenses incurred in producing a commodity. It includes activities like the actual
work of planting, cultivating, and harvesting crops, and the furnishing of ma-
chinery, implements, seed, and livestock.
(iii) The term "management of the production," refers to services per-
formed in making managerial decisions about the production of the crop, such as
when to plant, cultivate, dust, spray, or harvest, and includes advising and con-
sulting, making inspections, and making decisions on matters, such as the rota-
tion of crops, the type of crops to be grown, the type of livestock to be raised,
and the type of machinery and implements to be furnished.
(3) Material participation. (i) If you show that you periodically advise or
consult with the other person, who under the rental arrangement produces the
agricultural or horticultural commodities, and also show that you periodically
inspect the production activities on the land, you will have presented strong evi-
dence that you are materially participating.
(ii) If you also show that you furnish a large portion of the machinery,
tools, and livestock used in the production of the commodities, or that you fur-
nish or advance monies, or assume financial responsibility, for a substantial part
of the expense involved in the production of the commodities, you will have es-
tablished that you are ulaterially participating.
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tion that can only be made on a case-to-case consideration." ' More-
over, the Social Security Act is to be given a liberal interpretation."7
"Material" is to be given "its common and well-understood mean-
ing" of "solid or weighty character; substantial; of consequence; not
to be dispensed with; important." 8 As previously stated, material
participation can be accomplished in either production of the com-
modity, management of the production of the commodity, or a com-
bination of the two.
49
1. Production: Furnishing Expenses and Incurring
Risk.-The regulations indicate that some physical work is neces-
sary to materially participate in the production of a commodity.5°
The position of the regulations was rejected in the oft-quoted dictum
of Henderson v. Flemming:51
[W]e know at least today that agriculture is or may be big
business. It takes more than land and a willing hand. It takes
working capital, frequently in considerable amounts. An owner
of land who is required to (and does) furnish substantial
amounts of cash, credit or supplies toward this mutual undertak-
ing which are reasonably needed in the production of the agri-
cultural commodity and from the success of which he must look
for actual recoupment likewise makes a "material
participation.""
Two other cases illustrate that no physical work is required for
material participation. In Bridie v. Ribicoff,53 the owner's only phys-
ical work consisted of watering the livestock on a few occasions,
46. Hoffman v. Ribicoff, 305 F.2d 1, 9 (8th Cir. 1962).
47. Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 1963); Harper v. Flemming, 288
F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1961); Henderson v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 882, 887 (5th Cir. 1960).
48. Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 1963).
49. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(i), 1.1402(a)-4(b)(4) (1986); 20 C.F.R. §
404.1082(c) (1979).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(ii) (1986) states that production refers to "the
physical work performed and the expenses incurred in producing a commodity" but further
states that "the mere undertaking to furnish machinery, implements and livestock and to incur
expenses is not, in and of itself, sufficient," thus implying that some physical work is required.
51. 283 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1960).
52. Id. at 888. The actual holding of the case was that the owner materially participated
through an agent (her son). The physical work required by the arrangement was breaking
ground and planting the crop. The court's opinion does not indicate whether the physical work
required was material in itself or whether material participation was accomplished only by a
combination of physical work by the agent and the furnishing of resources. For a discussion of
the case see infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text. Both I.R.C § 1402(a)(1) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 411(a)(l) (1983) were amended for taxable years beginning after December 31, 1973 to
provide that activities of agents are not considered in the determination of material
participation.
53. 194 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
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helping the tenant load the cattle for market, driving the tractor dur-
ing haying, and helping the tenants innoculate soybeans. 4 Clearly,
even in combination, these activities do not come close to being ma-
terial. The plaintiff leased the farm (a livestock operation in which
the crops grown on the land were fed to the livestock) on a stock
share basis.5 5 Although the tenant furnished the machinery, the
plaintiff was required to furnish one-half of the expenses of thresh-
ing, combining of soybeans, twine, and bailing wire, corn shelling,
veterinary expense and trucking, and the entire expense of grass
seed."6 Plaintiff also advanced all the money to buy the feeder cattle
and sows and the tenants did not reimburse him until the animals
were sold. 7 The court held that the plaintiff's furnishing of expenses
and advancement of capital, combined with his periodic advice and
consultation with the tenants, periodic inspection of livestock, and
involvement in management decisions constituted material participa-
tion. 8 Though the court found it unnecessary to decide whether the
advancement of capital alone can constitute material participation,
the emphasis on that factor by the court leaves little doubt that if
presented with a case in which advancement of capital and responsi-
bility for production expenses was the sole involvement of the owner,
the court would have found material participation to exist. 9
In Celebrezze v. Miller,60 plaintiff was eighty-two years old and
spoke no English.6 His physical activities had been greatly reduced
seven years prior to the years in question. 2 Two tenants cultivated
the cotton, corn, and sweet potatoes on the 121-acre farm and re-
ceived two-thirds of the crop.63 The oral arrangement required plain-
tiff to inspect the crops three or four times a month, pay one-third of
the costs of fertilizer, poisons, and labor hired, absorb one-third of
the losses, and advise and consult with the tenants during the inspec-
tions as to where to plant the crops and the application of fertilizer
54. Id. at 813.
55. Id. at 810.
56. Id. at 812.
57. Id.
58. Bridie v. Ribicoff, 194 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
59. The testimony recited by the court as to the plaintiff's involvement in management
decisions is equivocal. It does not appear that the lease contemplated that plaintiff would make
the final decisions; in fact, decisions were made jointly by the owner and the tenant. There was
substantial evidence of advice and consultation as to the livestock and it is possible that the
decision was based on this factor.
60. 333 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1964).
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 31.
63. Id. at 30.
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and poisons." The tenants conducted the farm operation, furnished
the seed, tilled the crops, arranged for additional hired labor when
necessary, and applied the fertilizer and poisons.65 In a short opinion,
the court held that the plaintiff materially participated in the pro-
duction. 6 Though not emphasized by the court, the fact that the
owner spoke no English emerges as the most significant factor in the
decision. Since it is difficult to believe that Miller's advice and con-
sultation were of much benefit to the tenants, the decision stands for
the proposition that the furnishing of one-third of the expenses, to-
gether with periodic inspection of the crop, constitutes material
participation.67
Since the courts have been somewhat unwilling to develop nu-
merical guidelines for material participation in production, the opin-
ions have focused on another factor: the risk assumed by the owner.
This is most often apparent in crop-share arrangements. In return
for furnishing a portion of the seed, fertilizer, machinery, etc., the
owner receives a portion of the crop or the proceeds of sale. He also
necessarily assumes the risk of low production or losses. The courts
have viewed this assumption of risk as evidence of material partici-
pation. The origin of this analysis was Henderson v. Flemming,8
which involved Mrs. Poole, a ninety-one year-old invalid confined to
a wheel chair. The arrangement required her to break ground and to
plant the crop, which she did through her son on a contract basis.6 9
The court held that the physical work could be accomplished
through an agent,70 but the physical work involved was apparently
insufficient to constitute material participation.7 1 The owner was re-
quired to furnish the seed, to pay one-half the cost of insecticide, to
pay the fuel costs, and to absorb the depreciation on the machin-
64. Id. at 30-31.
65. Celebrezze v. Miller, 333 F.2d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1964).
66. Most of the opinion was devoted to distinguishing the case from Celebrezze v. Max-
well, 315 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963). In Maxwell, the owner furnished one-fourth of the cotton
seed, fertilizer, and poison for that seed and only two of the five tenants grew cotton. The
owner apparently furnished none of the expenses of growing corn, which four of the five te-
nants grew. The court found that the material participation standard was not met.
67. It is, of course, possible that Miller and the tenants spoke a common language or
that Miller employed a translator to convey his advice to the tenants. However, the opinion is
totally silent on this question. In view of the importance the regulations attach to advice and
consultations, it is highly likely that the court would have referred to these facts if they
existed.
68. 283 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1960).
69. Id. at 885.
70. This is no longer the case. See supra note 52.
71. Henderson v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 882, 887-88 (5th Cir. 1960).
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ery.7" These costs were substantial, especially in relation to her in-
come from the farming operation.7 Although the responsibility for
the expenses combined with the physical work of her son could have
been the basis for a finding of material participation, the court based
its decision on the risk taken by the owner:
Under the sharecropping arrangements effected in her be-
half by [her son], Mrs. Poole, of course, furnished the land. But
there was much more. She was required to bear a considerable
financial risk and contribution. She furnished the planting seed
and bore one-half the cost of insecticide which ran in the neigh-
borhood of $1100 per year . . .[t]he charges [for] the out-of-
pocket labor and fuel expense for the operation of the expensive
farm machinery and depreciation thereon . . . was a substantial
item and for the two years in question was in the neighborhood
of $2500 to $4000. The sharecropping tenants, on the other
hand, were required to bear one-half the cost of insecticides, the
entire cost of fertilizer, as well as the labor and simple farm
tools for harvesting. Actually, of course, Mrs. Poole had to fi-
nance the cost of fertilizer which would run several thousands of
dollars and her reimbursement would come as a back-charge
against the tenants' share when and as the cotton was harvested,
ginned and sold. After deducting back charges due by the share-
cropper tenants, the proceeds of the cotton were split 50/50.7"
After noting the significance of capital in operating a modern
farm," the court emphasized the importance of this risk:
An owner of land who is required to (and does) furnish substan-
tial amounts of cash, credit or supplies toward this mutual un-
dertaking which are reasonably needed in the production of the
agricultural commodity and from the success of which he must
look for actual recoupment likewise makes a "material partici-
pation." One is hardly a mere landlord in the traditional sense if
he must risk considerable funds in addition to the land in the
success of the venture. And what he gets-or hopes to get-is
more than rent. It is profit from the operation of a business, a
business fraught with financial risks-the business of producing
agricultural commodities."
72. Id. at 885-86.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
76. Henderson v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 882, 888 (5th Cir. 1960).
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2. Management of the Production: Decision-Making.-As dis-
cussed above, despite the emphasis of the regulations on physical
work in determining material participation in production, the courts
instead have focused on the furnishing of resources and the risk un-
dertaken by the owner. A similar process has occurred in the other
means of satisfying the material participation test: the management
of the production. The regulations specify two factors-the making
of managerial decisions relating to the production of the commodity,
and advising, consulting, and inspecting the production facilities-to
be considered in the decision on material participation." However,
the regulations clearly indicate that advice, consultation, and inspec-
tion are to be weighted more heavily than decision-making. 8 Despite
the language in the regulations, the decided cases have, on the
whole, taken the more logical, position that the decisive factor should
be who makes the final and more important decisions and that in-
spections, consultation, and advice are only a factor to be considered
in the determination.
Perhaps the clearest case illustrating the emphasis of the courts
on decision making is McCormick v. Richardson.79 On his retire-
ment,8" McCormick became active in managing a 160-acre farm he
owned in Illinois, which had become badly run down.81 He hired a
person to clear a woodland area, remove the timber and stumps, and
prepare the land for planting.82 He and the tenant (who had farmed
the land under an oral arrangement with McCormick for the past
seven years) agreed that modern farm machinery was required,
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(iii) (1986); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1082(c)(2)(iii) (1979).
78. Thus, Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(iii) provides:
The services which are considered of particular importance in making such man-
agement decisions are those services performed in making inspections of the pro-
duction activities and in advising and consulting with such person as to the pro-
duction of the commodities. Thus, if under the arrangement it is understood that
the owner or tenant is to advise or consult periodically with the other person as
to the production of the commodities required to be produced by such person
under the arrangement and to inspect periodically the production activities on
the land, a strong inference will be drawn that the arrangement contemplates
participation by the owner or tenant in the management of the production of
such commodities. The mere undertaking to select the crops or livestock to be
produced or the type of machinery and implements to be furnished or to make
decisions as to the rotation of crops generally is not, in and of itself, sufficient.
Such factors may be significant, however, in making the overall determination of
whether the arrangement contemplates that the owner or tenant is to participate
materially in the management of the production of the commodities.
See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1082(c)(3)(i).
79. 460 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1972).
80. From the I.R.S., ironically enough. Leave it to the I.R.S. to sue its own.
81. McCormick v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 783, 784 (10th Cir. 1972).
82. Id.
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which was purchased by the tenant.83 Under the arrangement, Mc-
Cormick was responsible for the cost of furnishing and spreading
lime and rock phosphate, the real estate taxes, insurance, building
and fence repair, the cleaning and maintenance of a drainage ditch
on the farm, the cost of clover seed, nitrogen, poison and weed
killer, 84 and forty percent of the cost of fertilizer (other than nitro-
gen and phosphate).85
Although the court might have based its decision on the re-
sources furnished by the owner, instead it emphasized McCormick's
active involvement in the operation of the farm and responsibility for
management in finding he materially participated in the manage-
ment of the production.86 McCormick determined when soil tests
should be made and had them done, and he carefully and regularly
inspected the production activities. 87 During his inspection each fall,
he particularly focused on the production of each grain, how the
ground was seeded, and the use of weed killer.88 He also had aerial
photographs made of the different fields. 89 From these inspections,
McCormick determined a detailed plan for the following year's
crops.90 Though McCormick and the tenant usually agreed, it was
understood that in the event of disagreement, McCormick reserved
the right to make the final decision.9 McCormick prepared a careful
plan of crop rotation each fall, and decided whether a government
crop plan should be used.92 He also devised several innovative meth-
ods to deal with problems on the farm that greatly increased the
farm's production.93 The court ruled that McCormick made a "very
substantial and helpful contribution to the management of produc-
tion, which resulted in a very large increase in the amount of crops
produced," which constituted material participation. 4 The court
stated:
The phrase, "the management of the production of such ag-
ricultural . . . commodities" means, we hold, the determination
of what shall be done or carried out which will affect production
83. Id.
84. Id. at 785.
85. Id.
86. McCormick v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1972).




91. McCormick v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 783, 785 (10th Cir. 1972).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 785-86.
94. Id. at 787.
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and how and by whom it shall be done or carried out. And it
does not mean the physical exertion by which the actual doing
or carrying out of the operation is accomplished. Hence, physi-
cal participation is not required.9"
The court held that McCormick had satisfied the test:
The record clearly shows that McCormick actively partici-
pated in every important decision that was made which materi-
ally affected production; that in the event of disagreement his
views were to and did prevail; that he initiated many actions and
of his own volition carried out several actions, all of which mate-
rially increased production; and by planning and requiring the
carrying out each year of proper crop rotation, he built the 160-
acre farm up from a farm of "badly run down condition" to one
of good condition and susceptible of a high level of production."
Another leading case in this area is Foster v. Celebrezze,9" in
which the sole question was whether an arrangement for material
participation by the owner existed. The lease provided that the te-
nants agreed "to put in such crops in such manner as the Landlord
may direct." 98 The court ruled that this provision gave the owner
"broad managerial powers," including the rights to direct and super-
vise the preparation of the seed bed, the time and method of planting
the seed, the amount of seed planted, and other matters "which
would appear to be substantial managerial functions which would
have a material bearing upon production."99 Together with other
lease provisions that gave the owner the rights to approve seed
planted, to designate the fields on which manure was spread as fertil-
izer, to determine which meadows and fields were to be ploughed, to
direct weed cutting and clipping of clover, and to determine partici-
pation in government support programs, the court determined that
the quoted provision constituted an arrangement for material partici-
pation under the normal meaning of that term. 10 Although the court
mentioned that the exercise of the owner's reserved rights would re-
quire numerous and periodic advice and consultation, the decision is
clearly based on the decision-making power of the owner.'
Perhaps the two cases most clearly illustrating the emphasis of
95. Id.
96. McCormick v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1972).
97. 313 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1963).
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the courts on decision-making are Hoffman v. Gardner °2 and Cole-
gate v. Gardner.03 In Hoffman, the claimant lived in Missouri. His
farms in Iowa were supervised by his brother-in-law, who farmed
land near the claimant's farms." 4 The only evidence of advice, in-
spections, and consultations were that the claimant consulted period-
ically with his brother-in-law and occasionally with the tenants di-
rectly by telephone and letter, sometimes instructing the tenants
about the crops, and that claimant and his daughter spent one week
a year on the farms. 10 5 All other advice, consultation, and inspec-
tions were made by the brother-in-law, who kept claimant advised of
conditions and relayed claimant's instructions to the tenants.'06 The
leases, however, gave claimant complete managerial control; the te-
nants were only permitted to make suggestions.'07 The owner deter-
mined the crops to be planted, the time and location of the planting,
the type of seed, the crop rotation plan, the price and time of sale of
the crops, and conservation measures.'0 8 He kept charts showing
crop information and each year sent the tenants a map showing
where to fertilize, the type of fertilizer, terracing, and other mat-
ters.'0 9 The court had no trouble holding that the owner made im-
portant decisions concerning production and that this constituted
material participation, despite the limited inspections." 0
In Colegate, the claimant owned and lived on a 65-acre farm."'
She entered into an arrangement with a neighbor to farm most of
her acres. Expenses were shared equally, except that the tenant pro-
vided the machinery." 2 At planting time, claimant made two inspec-
102. 369 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1966).
103. 265 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
104. Hoffman v. Gardner, 369 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1966).




109. Hoffman v. Gardner, 369 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 1966).
110. Id. at 841-42. The court stated:
It is true that claimant here did not actually visit the farms except for a week
during the growing season, but one could hardly expect a person of his age to
traipse between his home in Missouri and his farms in Iowa, a round trip dis-
tance of some eight hundred miles, when he could accomplish the same thing by
letter and telephonic communication with his tenants and the employment of a
farmer brother-in-law who lived nearby and who actually visited the farms from
two to four times a month during the growing season . . . . About the only
things he did not do were to personally set foot on the farms at frequent inter-
vals and engage in the physical farming activities, neither of which is a require-
ment of the statute.
Id. (emphasis added).
111. Colegate v. Gardner, 265 F. Supp 987, 988 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
112. Id.
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tions of the area, each lasting about fifteen minutes." s She made no
regular inspections during the growing season, but went "around the
outside of the crops.'"" When the crop was harvested, claimant
made sure that her share of the crop was put in the proper place." 5
The only evidence on managerial decisions made by the owner was
that she decided what she wanted planted, a subject on which there
was apparently some disagreement between the owner and the ten-
ant."" The court did not view the joint nature of most decisions or
the near absence of disagreements between owner and tenant as un-
usual or as reflecting on the materiality of the owner's participa-
tion." 7 The court made short work of the argument that the claim-
ant did not materially participate because she made only two
inspections of fifteen minutes each and that consultations between
the owner and the tenant took place infrequently:
Between two old-time neighboring farmers, thoroughly familiar
with the detail of the day-to-day operation of farms in a particu-
lar locality, the management decisions are, in the most part,
made at the beginning and the end of the grain farm year.
There is no question that the petitioner dictated what would be
done at the beginning of the year, and there is no question that
she participated in the determination of what to do with the crop
at the end of the year.
It is further the view of this Court that the evidence estab-
lishes without a shadow of a doubt that the inspections and con-
sultations were important and material. The basic decision to
farm this sixty acres was made by the petitioner. The basic deci-
sion to grain farm it was made by the petitioner. The basic deci-
sion involving the question of what acreage was to be devoted to
soy beans in what year was made by the petitioner. The record
establishes the same fact with respect to where to plant hay, or
wheat, or corn. She superintended and directed the storage of
her part of the crops and also decided when to market those
crops. Her participation therefore was material ... .
IV. Material Participation Under Section 2032A
Code section 2032A states only that material participation
113. Id. at 989.
114. Id.
115. id.
116. Colegate v. Gardner, 265 F. Supp. 987, 989 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 989, 991.
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"shall be determined in a manner similar to the manner used for
purposes of paragraph (1) of section 1402(a)(relating to net earnings
from self-employment)."" '  The apparent purpose of this require-
ment was to keep the qualified real property in farm or business use
in furtherance of the statute's purpose of preserving the family
farm.'20 Material participation can be accomplished either by the
decedent or a member of his family (prior to the decedent's death)
and by either the qualified heir or a member of the qualified heir's
family (after the decedent's death).'' The Internal Revenue Service
has issued regulations designed to delineate the activities that will
constitute material participation. 2
The first test is that "[a]ctual employment of the decedent (or
of a member of the decedent's family) on a substantially full-time
basis (35 hours a week or more) or to any lesser extent necessary to
personally manage fully the farm or business in which the real prop-
erty to be valued under section 2032A is used constitutes material
participation.' 2  The activities of agents or employees (other than
family members) are not considered in the determination of material
participation. 24
If the involvement is less than full-time, the activities "must be
pursuant to an arrangement providing for actual participation in the
production or management of production where the land is used by
119. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
120. H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1976).
121. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(C)(ii), (c)(6)(B).
122. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3 (1986). It should be noted that the Service has ruled
that material participation is a factual determination and the Service will not issue advance
rulings on whether, under a given set of facts, material participation exists. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-
10-073 (Dec. 12, 1985).
123. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(l) (1986). The regulations, specifically referring to
farming activities, also provide that material participation can be present as long as all neces-
sary functions are performed, despite the fact that little or no activity occurs during nonpro-
ducing seasons. Id. The regulations also require that, if the individual is self-employed with
respect to the farm, his or her income from the farm must be earned income for self-employ-
ment tax purposes for the participant to be materially participating under § 2032A. Payment
of self-employment tax is not conclusive evidence of material participation. However, nonpay-
ment of the tax creates a presumption of lack of material participation and requires that the
executor demonstrate to the Service that material participation occurred and explain the rea-
son why taxes were not paid. In addition, all self-employment taxes due must be paid. Id. For
example, lack of payment because the threshold for filing a return was not met is an adequate
explanation. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-46-012 (Aug. 8, 1980). However, the Service has ruled that
only those self-employment taxes that can be assessed and are not barred by the statute of
limitations at the time of the determination of material participation must be paid. Rev. Rul.
83-32, 1983-1 C.B. 723.
124. The income tax regulations are similar. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(5) (1986).
However, this provision is not intended to disqualify farm land that is managed by a profes-
sional farm manager, if the decedent or a family member personally materially participates
under the terms of the arrangement.
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any nonfamily member, or any trust or business entity, in farming
or another business."'25 At the heart of the regulations is section
20.2032A-3(e)(2), which enumerates the factors considered in deter-
mining material participation:
No single factor is determinative of the presence of mate-
rial participation, but physical work126 and participation in man-
agement decisions"' are the principal factors to be considered.
As a minimum, the decedent and/or a family member must reg-
ularly advise or consult with the other managing party on the
operation of the business.12 8 While they need not make all final
management decisions alone, the decedent and/or family mem-
bers must participate in making a substantial number of these
decisions.129 Additionally, production activities on the land
should be inspected regularly by the family participant,30 ai,d
funds should be advanced and financial responsibility assumed
for a substantial portion of the expense involved in the operation
of the farm or other business in which the real property is
used. 3 ' In the case of a farm, the furnishing by the owner or
other family members of a substantial portion of the machinery,
implements, and livestock used in the production activities is an
important factor to consider in finding material participation. 32
With farms, hotels, or apartment buildings, the operation of
125. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(1) (1986) (emphasis added). It is important to note
that the same words, production or management of the production, as are used in the regula-
tions under § 1402 and in the Social Security Act, are used here.
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(ii) (1986) states that physical work is a major
ingredient in the production of a commodity.
127. This is one of the important factors in determining management of the production
under the Social Security Act cases. See supra text accompanying notes 78-118.
128. Advice and consultation is another key factor in the meaning of management of the
production under the income tax regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(iii) (1986).
129. This is clearly a belated recognition of the cases holding that "material" is to be
interpreted as meaning important or substantial, and that, if the owner makes, or participates
to a material degree in making, a substantial number of important management decisions, he
materially participates. See, e.g., Celebrezze v. Miller, 333 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1964); Foster v.
Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1963); Conley v. Ribicoff, 294 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1961);
Miller v. Fleming, 215 F. Supp. 691 (W.D. La. 1963).
130. This is emphasized in Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-4(b)(3)(iii) (1986) as part of the
decision on management of the production. In fact, that regulation places "particular impor-
tance" on inspections, together with advice and consultation. Id. The emphasis in both regula-
tions on these activities is informative.
131. This is one factor in the production of a commodity. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-
4(b)(3)(ii) (1986). The assumption of financial responsibility has been a crucial factor in
many of the cases. See, e.g., Celebrezze v. Miller, 333 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1964); Celebrezze v.
Wifstad, 314 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1963); Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1963);
Henderson v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1960); Miller v. Flemming, 215 F. Supp. 691
(W.D. La. 1963).
132. This is specifically stated as one factor relevant to the determination of whether an
owner has materially participated in the production of a commodity. Treas. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-
4(b)(3)(ii) (1986).
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which qualifies as a trade or business, the participating decedent
or heir's maintaining his or her principal place of residence on
the premises is a factor to consider in determining whether the
overall participation is material . .. ."I
Therefore, the same tests are used in the section 2032A regula-
tions (participation in the production or the management of the pro-
duction) as are used in the regulations under section 1402 of the
Code, All of the factors enumerated in the section 2032A regulations
are contained in the section 1402 regulations or have been recog-
nized by case law under the Social Security Act. The sole difference
between the regulations under section 2032A, on one hand, and the
regulations under section 1402 and the Social Security Act, on the
other, is that the section 2032A regulations appear to contemplate
involvement in several of the enumerated activities in order to consti-
tute material participation. The unstated requirement of the section
2032A regulations appears to be that even if, for example, the dece-
dent and the qualified heir (or members of their families) made most
final management decisions, this would not be enough to constitute
material participation without inspections or advice and consultation,
or the assumption of financial responsibility for a substantial portion
of the risk, or the maintenance of a home on the farm. This is rein-
forced by the requirement of the regulations that in the absence of
full-time involvement, the requirements of the section 2032A regula-
tions in addition to the requirements of the section 1402 regulations
must be met. 8 " An example in the regulations supports this thesis.
136
It should be remembered that the same argument was attempted in
many of the cases previously discussed, and the courts have unani-
mously rejected that position. 3 '
In light of the difference in tone and emphasis between the sec-
tion 2032A regulations and the section 1402 regulations and the
cases under the Social Security Act, an analysis of the regulations
133. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(2). This factor was important in finding material par-
ticipation in Colegate v. Gardner, 265 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
134. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(l) (1986).
135. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(g) (1986). Example (4) posits a qualified heir who is a
lawyer and lives 15 miles from the farm. He arranges with an unrelated party to manage the
farm. Under the arrangement, the qualified heir supplies all the machinery, assumes financial
responsibility for all expenses, approves a crop plan each year, is required to approve all ex-
penses over $100, inspects the farm weekly, and actively participates in management decisions.
The example states that the qualified heir materially participated, but further states that there
would be no material participation if the qualified heir did not inspect the farm regularly and
participate in management decisions, even if he assumed financial responsibility for the opera-
tions and approved the annual crop plan.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 78-118.
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and cases and the purposes of the statutes is necessary in order to
formulate possible hypotheses of the interpretation of material par-
ticipation under section 2032A.
V. Comparison of the Statutes: Three Hypotheses
A. Similar Means the Same
The first and perhaps most logical hypothesis is that when Con-
gress said that for section 2032A purposes material participation
shall be determined "in a manner similar to the manner used for
purposes of paragraph (1) of section 1402(a), 13 7 it meant that the
words should have the same meaning in the two Code sections. After
all, that is what similar means. Moreover, the regulations under the
three statutes discussed (sections 2032A and 1402(a) of the Code
and section 211 (a)(1) of the Social Security Act) all use the same
objects (production and the management of production) to which
material participation must be directed. All the statutes list similar
factors to be considered in determining whether material participa-
tion has been accomplished.1 38 Additionally, in the regulations under
all three sections, the key words, "production or management of pro-
duction," are stated in the alternative. In many cases under the So-
cial Security Act, the government contended that the presence of all
or several of the factors mentioned are necessary to satisfy the mate-
rial participation standard; the courts have unanimously rejected this
position.139 The difference in tone of the section 2032A regulations
described above can be viewed as merely another IRS attempt to
enforce a stricter standard, which should meet with no more success
than its previous attempts.
One answer to the argument (to be made in the next subsection)
that the purposes of the statutes are different and should be inter-
preted differently, is the cogent argument that Congress was aware
of the relationship between section 1402(a) of the Code and section
211(a) of the Social Security Act and the cases under the Social
Security Act when it enacted section 2032A and intended the same
interpretation to govern. ' Moreover, when words are used in sev-
eral places in the same statute, they should be given the same mean-
137. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
138. Since the revision in the Social Security Act regulations, one must refer to the case
law to determine these factors. See supra Section III.
139. See, e.g., McCormick v. Richardson, 460 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1972); Celebrezze v.
Benson, 314 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1963); Henderson v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1960);
Bridie v. Ribicoff, 194 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
140. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-99 (1979).
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ing unless the context clearly requires otherwise. Uniformity of
meaning and interpretation is highly desirable. If material participa-
tion is given a different meaning in section 2032A, a constitutional
question of the validity of the section 2032A regulations may be
raised.141
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the IRS has already ad-
mitted that section 2032A is a relief provision.142 In light of the con-
gressional history underlying section 2032A, this conclusion is obvi-
ous.1" 3 This characterization was recently recognized by an appellate
court in another context. 44 Relief provisions of the Code are to be
given a common sense interpretation, with the focus on the congres-
sional intent, and an overly-restrictive interpretation of such statutes
is to be avoided. 45 For all these reasons, material participation
should receive the same interpretation in section 2032A as it has in
section 1402(a) of the Code and section 211(a) of the Social Secur-
ity Act.
B. Similar Means Stricter
Section 1402(a)(1) of the Code and section 211(a)(1) of the
Social Security Act 146 are opposite sides of the same coin. Section
1402(a) defines net earnings from self-employment income. Section
1401 of the Code imposes a tax on such earnings. Section 211 (a) of
the Social Security Act defines net earnings from self-employment
income in the same way as section 1402(a) of the Code, but for the
purpose of determining benefits to which a person is entitled. 47
Stated differently, the tax collected from persons having self-employ-
ment income (as well as the taxes collected on wages and other
forms of income) provides the funds used to pay old age, survivor,
and death benefits mandated by the Social Security Act. To be eligi-
ble to receive benefits under social security, one must have contrib-
uted to the fund through taxes on wages or self-employment income.
The rationale behind the benefits is that persons whose income is
141. Indeed this question has already been raised, but the courts have so far avoided
resolving the question. See infra Section Vi.
142. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-52-011 (Sept. 18, 1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-46-021 (Aug. 8,
1980).
143. See Begleiter, supra note 3, at 22-25.
144. Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1989).
145. Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1128, 1133-34 (4th Cir. 1989);
Ross v. United States, 348 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1965) (interpreting § 2503(c)); Estate of Davis
v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1156 (1986); Estate of Baumgardner v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 445
(1985) (interpreting § 6512(b)).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982).
147. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 403 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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reduced due to inability to work because of age or disability should
have a portion of their former income replaced. Contributions to the
fund are made during a person's productive years when earning ca-
pacity is the greatest. However, income that is not subject to reduc-
tion because of age or disability (such as rents) is excluded from the
definition of self-employment income because there is no need to re-
place such income.14 8 Only income from a trade or business that de-
pends to some extent on the activity of the owner is included. 4 9
The material participation standard regarding income from
farming was enacted by the Social Security Amendments of 1956.110
The purpose of the Act was clearly stated in the Report of the Sen-
ate Committee on Finance: "The bill thus would extend coverage
under old-age and survivors insurance to certain farmers, who,
though not covered under the present law, have income from work
and therefore are exposed to the type of income loss against which
the program is designed to afford protection." 5 ' The Senate Finance
Committee, in discussing the amendment to the Social Security Act,
also formulated the basis for a liberal interpretation of material par-
ticipation: "Your Committee has consistently held the view that the
coverage of the program should be as nearly universal as practica-
ble."' 52 Thus, coverage under the Social Security Act was broadened
by the 1956 amendment.
If material participation is to be given a broad definition, farm-
ers who materially participate are subject to tax on the income
earned from farming in cases in which such income results at least
partially from their activity and, in turn, will be able to collect social
security benefits based on their earnings from farming when they are
no longer able to farm and their incomes (presumably) are dimin-
ished. A liberal interpretation of material participation in favor of
broad coverage clearly accords with the statement of purpose in the
Report of the Senate Finance Committee to tax self-employment in-
come earned during periods of significant farming activity and pay
social security benefits during periods of decreased activity and lower
income. This analysis is strengthened by viewing social security ben-
efits as, in a sense, an inexact "repayment" of the social security
148. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(1): 42 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(l) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
149. I.R.C. § 1402(a); 42 U.S.C. §'411(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
150. Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 836, tit. II, § 104(c)(2), 70 Stat. 824-25. Section
1402(a)(1) of the Code was similarly amended by Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 836, tit. II, §
201(e)(2), 70 Stat. 840-42.
151. S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3877, 3884.
152. Id. at 1, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3878.
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taxes previously paid.
Section 1402(a)(1) and section 211(a)(1) of the Social Security
Act are parallel. 5 If, as has been shown, material participation in
the latter is to be interpreted broadly so as to approach universal
coverage (within the limits set by Congress), the same interpretation
should govern that phrase in section 1402(a)(1) of the Code. Such
an interpretation is consistent with the congressional purpose.
It is much more difficult to view section 2032A in such terms.
Section 2032A is an exception to the normal estate tax rule valuing
property at its fair market value. 54 Exceptions in tax statutes are to
be strictly construed. 15 5 Moreover, many tests in addition to material
participation must be met in order to take advantage of special use
valuation.' In addition, section 2032A was aimed at providing re-
lief for only one group of farmers-family farmers who were forced
to sell their farms to pay estate taxes. 5 Section 2032A was intended
as a solution for a narrowly defined problem, justifying the many
requirements for qualification.
The type of person Congress wished to benefit was not in doubt.
It was the person who lived on and farmed his own land with the
help of his family and who expected his children to farm the land
when he died. As Senator Nelson expressed it:
For 100 years in this country, we have had a system where
farms and businesses could be passed along from one generation
to another. These enterprises put down roots in their communi-
ties. Their owners came to care about their employees, their cus-
tomers, their churches, schools and hospitals. They work in the
local charities and clubs and are the cement of community
life.158
Absent from the debate on special use valuation are two important
policies underlying section 211(a) of the Social Security Act and
Code section 1402(a)-universal coverage and a "return of past pay-
ments"-that have greatly influenced the liberal interpretation of
153. Henderson v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 882, 887 (5th Cir. 1960).
154. I.R.C. § 2031; Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1986).
155. Universal Oil Prods. v. Campbell, 181 F.2d 451, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 850 (1950); Commissioner v. Swent, 155 F.2d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 801 (1947); United States v. Stiles, 56 F. Supp. 881, 883 (W.D. Ark. 1944); Wallace v.
United States, 50 F. Supp. 178, 179 (W.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 142 F.2d 240
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 712 (1944). See alsd United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60,
71 (1940).
156. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
157. See supra text accompanying note 9-28; Begleiter, supra note 3, at 17-26.
158. 122 CONG. REC. 25948-49 (1976).
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material participation in the decided cases.
Moreover, the inclusion of the material participation require-
ment may have had the additional purpose of confining the benefits
of section 2032A to family farms. 59 Congress did not wish to benefit
corporate agribusiness; rather, it desired to keep as much farmland
as possible in the hands of family farmers and prevent large agricul-
tural corporations from purchasing farmland from families of small
farmers who were forced to sell the land to pay estate taxes. By re-
quiring material participation, which had a relatively well-defined
meaning by the mid-1970s, Congress attempted to ensure that farms
owned by large landowners or farm corporations would not qual-
ify. '160 The material participation requirement, particularly by its fo-
cus on decision-making, effectively eliminates the large farm corpo-
ration from qualifying under section 2032A. The narrower the
reading of material participation given by the courts, the fewer the
number of estates that will qualify for special use valuation. A strict
interpretation of material participation for section 2032A, so the ar-
gument goes, will restrict those qualifying for its benefits to a class
much closer to the congressional ideal of the family farmer.'6 '
This discussion permits the section 2032A regulations to be
evaluated in a different light. Possibly implicitly recognizing the
strength of the foregoing argument, the regulations were deliberately
conceived and developed to implement the congressional purpose.
The factors to be weighed in determining material participation were
deliberately made cumulative, rather than alternative.' 62 Possibly the
intent of the regulations is that making managerial decisions should
not be sufficient to constitute material participation. More should be
required." 3 The idea may be to require so much activity that most
"absentee landlords" will be unable to or not attempt to fulfill the
requirements, thereby restricting the benefits of special use valuation
to "true family farmers," as Congress intended. Moreover, requiring
several activities to satisfy the material participation test may en-
courage those wishing to take advantage of special use valuation to
159. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
160. As previously stated, § 1402(a) of the Code was amended in 1974 to exclude vicari-
ous material participation by agents. Act of Aug. 7, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-368, § 10(b), 88
Stat. 420 (1974). It is unlikely that a large landowner or any one officer of a large corporation
would be involved in sufficient activity as to any one farm to materially participate under the
case law.
161. See supra text accompanying note 158.
162. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(2) (1986).
163. For example, a combination of decision-making, advice, consultation, furnishing of
resources, and physical labor.
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increase their farming activities and become "family farmers" in the
sense Congress envisioned. In this connection, the statement in the
regulations that the maintenance of the decedent's principal place of
residence on the farm is a factor in determining material participa-
tion takes on added significance. 164 Living on the farm is the essence
of the congressional ideal of the family farmer.
C. The Middle Ground
Despite the force of the arguments for a stricter standard, it is
highly unlikely that the courts will support such an interpretation.
First, the overriding statutory command that material participation
is to be given a similar meaning to that term in section 1402(a)165 of
the Code carries great weight. Second, uniformity of interpretation
in the tax laws, especially when clearly indicated by Congress, is
highly important. Third, Congress presumably was aware of the in-
terpretation by the courts of material participation under the Social
Security Act and the parallel between section 211 (a) of that Act and
Code section 1402(a) when it enacted section 2032A. 66 Fourth, even
though the tone of the section 2032A regulations suggests that more
is required to satisfy the material participation standard under sec-
tion 2032A than under section 1402, the regulations use the same
general factors (production or the management of the production) as
the regulations under section 1402; both regulations state these fac-
tors as alternatives; and the activities under each category in the sec-
tion 2032A regulations are the same factors used in the section 1402
regulations and the case law under the Social Security Act. Cumula-
tively, these arguments carry great weight.
Furthermore, in another context, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has recently recognized that section 2032A is a relief
measure, "a means whereby Congress sacrifices federal tax revenues
to encourage a given type of behavior, ' 16 7 in this case, fostering fam-
ily farms. The court noted that the congressional intent that "the
federal estate tax should not be the ruin of legitimate family busi-
nesses" was clear. 68 In such cases, "Congress has declared that this
statute be given a common sense interpretation, one with an eye to-
wards protecting the family farm and business." '69 The court quoted
164. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(2) (1986).
165. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(6).
166. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-99 (1979).
167. Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1128, 1136 (4th Cir. 1989).
168. Id. at 1133.
169. Id. at 1134.
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with approval the following statement of the Tax Court: "When
Congress clearly demonstrates an intent to preserve an institution,
such as the family farm and family owned businesses, a common
sense approach should be applied, and the technical inadequacies of
the statute should be subservient to the overriding Congressional in-
tent. 170 Under a "common sense" approach, material participation
in section 2032A, in almost all cases, should be interpreted similarly
to Code section 1402(a) and the cases decided under the Social Se-
curity Act.
In addition, the major argument justifying a stricter standard
(that such a standard is necessary to accomplish the congressional
purpose) is undermined by the fact that such a purpose can be ac-
complished by giving material participation a broad interpretation
among the class Congress wished to benefit. Congress clearly wished
to make the benefits of special use valuation available to family
farmers. Consistent with this purpose, material participation could
be broadly interpreted to include all family farmers who meet the
other requirements of the statute. Such an interpretation would pro-
duce the same result as the stricter interpretation without raising the
question of whether the section 2032A regulations are invalid by re-
quiring greater activity than is required under Code section 1402,
thus violating section 2032A(e)(6).
Under this standard, material participation would be given the
same interpretation in section 2032A as it is under Code section
1402(a). The cases decided under the Social Security Act would be
used as precedents, except when to do so would allow land owned by
a decedent who clearly did not fit the congressional mold to qualify.
VI. Material Participation Under Section 2032A in the Courts
A. The Early Cases
1. Estate of Coon v. Commissioner. -The most significant
of the early cases is the Coon case. Decedent owned an interest in
three farms, and her brother, on behalf of decedent, executed leases
with experienced farmers. The leases were somewhat ambiguous as
to participation by the landlords. 7 ' The system of crop rotation es-
tablished by decedent's father before 1950 was generally followed,
but each year decedent's brother "and the tenants discussed the
170. Id. (quoting Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1156 (1986)).
171. 81 T.C. 602 (1983).
172. Id. at 603-05. The court did not treat this as significant, but focused on actual
participation.
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planned crops for the succeeding year, especially when major
changes in the rotation system were contemplated. 173 Since the te-
nants were experienced farmers, many of the production decisions,
such as when to plow, fertilize, disk, plant, and harvest, were made
by the tenants without consultation. However, decedent's brother
was consulted on improvements and major repairs. 174 In accordance
with the custom in the area, the tenants provided all the production
machinery. Neither decedent nor any member of her family resided
on the farm.
175
Although neither decedent nor her brother performed any phys-
ical work on the farm, decedent's brother maintained detailed finan-
cial records on the farm operation and prepared an annual report.17
He consulted regularly (once or twice a week) with one of the te-
nants who acted as liaison between him and the other tenants.7 7 He
regularly inspected the farms by automobile during summer eve-
nings, and also after major storms, when he looked for damage. 7"
The landlords also paid for a portion of seed and fertilizer.'79
Emphasizing the section 2032A regulations, the Tax Court
ruled that decedent, through her brother, did not materially partici-
pate. 80 While admitting that the landlords assumed a substantial
portion of the operating expenses of the farms and that decedent's
brother did participate in management decisions and approve major
expenditures, the court noted that the advice, consultation, and deci-
sion-making required the brother's attention on an infrequent ba-
sis.'18 Moreover, the court ruled that the estate had not established
the extent to which his conversations with the liaison tenant related
to the actual operations of the farms.8 2 In light of the fact that the
tenants made many of the operating decisions, the court concluded
that decedent's brother did not participate in a substantial number
of final management decisions."83 Furthermore, the viewing of the
farms on evenings and some weekends from a car and checking on
173. Estate of Coon v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 602, 605-06 (1983).




178. Estate of Coon v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 602, 606 (1983).
179. Id. at 609. The lease required the landlord to assume one-half of the cost of seed,
property taxes, fire, and wind insurance on the residence and all buildings used to store grain
and machinery. Id. at 610.
180. Id. at 611.
181. Id. at 609-10.
182. Id. at 612.
183. Estate of Coon v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 602, 612-13 (1983).
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damage after major storms did not constitute inspecting the produc-
tion activities.
18 4
The estate further argued that the section 2032A regulations
are invalid to the extent that they require a higher standard of activ-
ity than the regulations under Code section 1402(a)(1).18 5 The court
found it unnecessary to decide this question because it decided that
the activities of decedent and her brother did not satisfy the material
participation standard of regulation section 1.1402(a)-4(b). 18 The
court determined that the advice and consultation with the tenants
was limited to crop rotation and not the production decisions, that
decedent did not inspect the production activities, that the tenants
furnished the machinery, but that the landlords assumed a substan-
tial portion of the financial responsibility of producing the crops. The
court concluded that this set of facts did not amount to material
participation in the management of production. 8 7
A number of points in the Coon opinion are noteworthy. First,
the court gave great emphasis to the section 2032A regulations; in-
deed, the opinion consists entirely of an analysis of whether decedent
or a member of her family satisfied the regulations. Second, the
court emphasized (as do the regulations) the importance of activities
related to actual production-such as plowing, planting, disking, and
harvesting-and indicated that inspections must be of these activities
to assume significance. Third, the court's decision that decedent did
not materially participate under section 1402 made it unnecessary to
determine whether regulation section 20.2032A-3 was invalid to the
extent that it imposed a higher standard than the regulations under
section 1402(a)(1). If the stricter standard approach previously de-
scribed' 8 is adopted, this becomes an extremely significant question
that remains unresolved.
However, the most astounding thing about the Coon opinion is
that the court neither cites nor discusses any cases in support of its
conclusion that the decedent did not satisfy the material participa-
tion requirement. This is significant since there are cases finding ma-
terial participation that involved each of the aspects present in Coon.
Bridie v. Ribicoff/89 and Henderson v. Flemming'9" indicate that the
184. Id. at 610.
185. Id. at 611.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 612.
188. See supra Section V.B.
189. 194 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
190. 283 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1960).
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furnishing of a substantial amount of capital, without more, is suffi-
cient to constitute material participation. In Celebrezze v. Miller,'91
the landlord spoke no English. 19 It is hard to believe that his consul-
tation with the tenants was more productive than that of Frank
Coon. In Colegate v. Gardner,'"3 decedent made two fifteen-minute
inspections during planting time and went "around the outside of the
crops"' 94 during the growing season, approximately what was done
by Mr. Coon. In Bridie, the tenant furnished all the farm machin-
ery. "'95 And in both Bridie'" and Colegate v. Gardner,17 the owner
and tenant made managerial decisions jointly, almost never disagree-
ing. Both courts viewed this joint decision-making as entirely natural
between two experienced farmers, having no substantial influence on
the material participation decision.'" In every case cited in this par-
agraph, the court found that material participation existed for Social
Security Act purposes. Although the lack of furnishing of farm ma-
chinery and the making of many production decisions by the tenant
without consulting the landlord makes Coon a closer case, it is en-
tirely possible that under the cases just discussed, the Coon facts
constitute material participation. The failure of the court in Coon to
discuss these cases is inexplicable and renders the decision questiona-
ble at best.
2. Schuneman v. United States.'99-From the time she ac-
quired an interest in the farm in 1956, decedent operated the farm,
hiring neighboring farmers to plant and harvest the crop. °00 From
1969 to 1975, she had a crop share lease with a neighboring farmer
under which decedent clearly materially participated. 10' Decedent's
health deteriorated, and in 1976 she and the same tenant executed a
fixed rent lease.20 2 The lease was modified in 1977 to provide a rent
adjustment clause. During 1976, decedent continued to advise and
191. 333 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1964).
192. Id. at 30.
193. 265 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
194. Id. at 989.
195. 194 F. Supp. 809 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
196. Id. at 814.
197. 265 F. Supp. 987, 989 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
198. Colegate v. Gardner, 265 F. Supp. 987, 989 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Bridie v. Ribicoff,
194 F. Supp. 809, 814 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
199. 783 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'g in part and vacating in part, 570 F. Supp.
1327 (C.D. Ill. 1983). See also 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 13,561 (D.C. Ill. 1984).
200. 783 F.2d at 695.
201. Id. at 695-96.
202. Id. at 696.
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consult with the tenant and inspect the production facilities.2"' Dece-
dent died on April 23, 1977.204 The major issue in the case was
whether decedent was using the land for a qualified use at the date
of her death.
20 5
The opinion of the trial court is confusing. After correctly stat-
ing that qualified use and material participation are separate re-
quirements, 0 6 the trial court held that the qualified use requirement
could be satisfied by showing that the decedent materially partici-
pated in the operation of the farm during the year of her death, thus
combining the two requirements. 0 7 On the trial of that issue, the
court directed a verdict for the government, ruling that decedent did
not materially participate at her death.208 This ruling is, of course,
correct in that the only activities performed by decedent under the
1977 lease were allowing the tenant to store grain in her storage bins
and repairing some farm buildings.20 9 However, since the require-
ments are separate, material participation at death does not satisfy
the qualified use requirement. Moreover, there is no statutory re-
quirement that decedent materially participate in the operation of
the farm on the date of death.21 0 The estate did not appeal the dis-
trict court's decision that decedent failed to materially participate at
her death, but did appeal the ruling that the 1977 lease was not
substantially dependent on production.211 On appeal, the government
conceded that decedent satisfied all the conditions for special use val-
uation except for qualified use. l2 This concession removed any ma-
terial participation issue from the case. The court of appeals decided
that the rent reduction clause made the lease substantially dependent
on production, thus satisfying the qualified use text. 13 Because dece-
dent was clearly materially participating for five of the eight years
prior to her death, Schuneman is of little use to an analysis of mate-
rial participation.
203. Id.
204. Schuneman v. United States, 783 F.2d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 1986).
205. Id. at 697.
206. 570 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (C.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 783
F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Martin v. Commissioner, 783 F.2d 81, 82 (7th Cir. 1986);
Burch v. United States, 86-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 13,692 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
207. 570 F. Supp. at 1331.
208. Id. See also 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 13,561 (D.C. I11. 1984).
209. 570 F. Supp. at 1331.
210. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(l)(C)(ii) requires only that material participation exist for five
of the eight year period ending on the date of the decedent's death.
211. Schuneman v. United States, 783 F.2d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 1986).
212. Id. at 698.
213. Id. at 701.
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3. Estate of Sherrod.21 4-In this case, most of the land owned
by the decedent was in timber, the remainder was cropland and pas-
ture.215 From 1952 to 1972, decedent personally inspected the
timberland several times a year, paid the taxes on the land, negoti-
ated the contracts for selective cutting of the timber over the years,
and supervised the cutting.21 The cropland and pasture were rented
to an unrelated third party for a cash rental.2"7 The rental agree-
ments were negotiated and supervised by decedent.2 18 Decedent and
his son maintained regular contacts with the tenants of the cropland
and pasture.219 When decedent entered a nursing home in 1972, he
conveyed the land to a revocable trust with his two children as trust-
ees.220 From 1972 until decedent's death in 1977, decedent's son, as
trustee, performed the managerial services his father had performed
until 1972.221 The court held that these activities constituted mate-
rial participation by the decedent and by his son, as trustee.222
The court's main emphasis was that decedent had managed an
active farming business and made every management decision with
respect to the property.223 The government argued that decedent's
activities did not take a great deal of time and that decedent failed
to construct fire trails, prune dead and undesirable growth, and thin
the timber from time to time. 224 The court rejected that argument,
ruling that the nature of timber farming does not require a great
deal of time or labor. 225 Decedent devoted the time necessary to per-
form all managerial functions and made every management decision,
which was sufficient to constitute material participation.22 On ap-
peal, this portion of the decision was affirmed.227
214. Estate of Sherrod v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 523 (1984), rev'd on other grounds,
774 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1985).
215. Id. at 525.
216. Id. at 533.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Estate of Sherrod v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 523, 533 (1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 774 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1985).
220. Id. at 528.
221. Id. at 528-29.
222. Id. at 534-35.
223. id. at 534.
224. Estate of Sherrod v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 523, 535 (1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 774 F.2d 1057 (11 th Cir. 1985).
225. Id. at 535-36.
226. Id. at 535-36.
227. 774 F.2d at 1063. The appellate court, however, found that the qualified use stan-
dard was not met as to the crop and pasture land. The estate had argued, and the Tax Court
agreed, that all decedent's eligible land could be combined into one business based on the
custom of the locality to do so and that such combination was consistent with good manage-
ment practices. Id. at 1065. The Court of Appeals disagreed, ruling that nonqualifying prop-
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The main importance of Sherrod lies with the court's affirmance
of the principle of the regulations that year-round activity is not nec-
essary during periods when the nature of the business does not re-
quire a great deal of activity228 and its emphasis on the making of
managerial decisions as satisfying the material participation
regulations.
B. The Recent Cases
1. Estate of Heffley v. Commissioner.229-This was the easiest
of the recent cases to decide. From 1972 to 1976, decedent's farm
was rented to her brother-in-law under a crop share arrangement. 30
From 1976 to 1980, it was rented to him for a cash rent.23' In 1981,
the year of decedent's death, after decedent had conveyed the land
to a revocable trust, the trustee leased the land to a cousin under a
cash rent lease.232 Under all the leases, the tenants had full responsi-
bility for the management of the farm. 233 None of the leases called
for any participation by the decedent or the trustee.234 For the entire
period, decedent's poor health prevented her from performing any
work on the farm.2 5 Although her son performed occasional minor
chores, these were not sufficient to constitute material participa-
tion.236 Neither decedent nor her son made any management deci-
sions nor advised or consulted with the tenants as to these deci-
237sions.   Neither inspected the crops nor assumed financial
responsibility for the farm operations.23 8 The decedent did not treat
the farm income as self-employment income on her tax returns.2 39
Given these facts, the Tax Court could only reach the conclusion
that neither decedent nor any member of her family materially
participated.24°
erty must be functionally related to qualifying property to qualify. Id. at 1066. The crop and
pasture land were not functionally related to the timber business conducted by the decedent.
Id. at 1067. Since the fair market value of the timberland constituted only 26% of the ad-
justed gross estate, the 50% test of I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(I)(A) was not met. Id.
228. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(l) (1986).
229. 89 T.C. 265 (1987).
230. Id. at 267.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 268.
233. Id. at 267-68.
234. Estate of Heffley v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 265, 267-68 (1987).
235. Id. at 272.
236. Id. at 274.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Estate of Heffley v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 265, 274 (1987).
240. Id. at 275.
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2. Estate of Coffing v. Commissioner"4 1 and Estate of Ward v.
Commissioner. 2  In two cases decided on the same day with opin-
ions written by the same judge, the Tax Court continued its practice
of relying almost exclusively on the section 2032A regulations. In
Coffing, decedent never resided on either farm for which a section
2032A election was made.24 About twelve years prior to her death,
decedent contracted with a corporate farm operator to manage one
of the farms.24 Beginning three years before decedent's death, the
hired farm operator also managed decedent's other farm.245 Dece-
dent took extended trips from Indiana to Texas to visit her brother
during the eight year period preceding her death; she also spent sig-
nificant periods in hospitals and nursing homes.2 46 The lease pro-
vided that decedent maintain a bank account to be drawn on by the
managers to pay taxes, insurance, management charges, and other
expenses.247 The manager studied the property, selected tenants
(subject to the owner's approval), and managed the farms com-
pletely.248 The only duties and rights of the owner under the lease
were to approve major capital expenses, tenants, and the type of ten-
ure.24'9 The decedent furnished one-half of most expenses, but no ma-
chinery.250 In 1965, shortly after signing the farm service contract,
decedent and a representative of the manager discussed and selected
the basic plan of operating the farm, which did not change until de-
cedent's death.25' The farm manager did discuss the farm operation
with decedent about once a month, and took decedent to inspect the
farms monthly. The visits lasted about one hour. Decedent did in-
spect the quarterly and yearly reports provided by the corporate
manager, but rarely vetoed its recommendations. 252 The farm in-
come was not reported as self-employment income on decedent's tax
returns. 53
The court found that decedent did not materially participate.
25 4
241. 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314 (1987).
242. 89 T.C. 54 (1987).
243. Estate of Coffing v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314, 1314 (1987).
244. Id. at 1316.
245. Id. at 1319.
246. Id. at 1315.
247. Id. at 1316.
248. Estate of Coffing v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314, 1316 (1987).
249. Id. at 1315-16.
250. Id. at 1316-18.
251. Id. at 1317-18.
252. Id. at 1318.
253. Estate of Coiling v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314, 1319 (1987).
254. Id. at 1323.
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In an opinion strikingly similar to Coon2"' (and which, indeed, spent
most of its time comparing the facts to those in Coon), the court
concluded that although decedent did inspect the production activi-
ties to a greater extent than did the decedent in Coon, she was less
involved in decision-making. 56 Overall, the court found no signifi-
cant difference between the cases that would necessitate a different
result.257
The decision in Coffing is subject to the same criticisms as
Coon, on which it is based. Granting that because most of the deci-
sions were made by the representative of the farm manager the case
becomes close, decedent occasionally did reject the recommendations
of the manager, inspected the farms periodically, and assumed sig-
nificant financial responsibility for the farm operation. Again, the
decision neither cited nor discussed the cases under the Social Secur-
ity Act. The case represents the Tax Court's adoption of the view
that material participation in section 2032A should be interpreted
more strictly than under section 1402.
In Ward, decedent resided on the farm.258 For the eight years
prior to her death, the farm was operated by a tenant under a crop
share arrangement. 59 Under the arrangement, the tenant furnished
all the equipment, decedent furnished the entire cost of liming the
soil and the installation of drainage tile, and they split the cost of
seed, fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide.26 The court noted that a
grain farm the size of decedent's farm requires only about three
weeks of working days during the year to plow, plant, spray ditches,
mow roadsides, and harvest. 26 1 Decedent observed the operation of
the farm daily from her residence, consulted with the tenant once or
twice a week on production activities, inspected the fields, main-
tained books of farm income and expenses, subscribed to several
farm publications, and followed the daily market reports.262
The Tax Court, in an opinion similar in form to Coon263 and
255. Estate of Coon v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 602 (1983). See supra notes 171-98 and
accompanying text.
256. Estate of Coffing v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314, 1323 (1987).
257. Id. at 1322-23.
258. Estate of Ward v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 54, 54-55 (1987).
259. Id. at 64. The tenant had share cropped the farm with decedent and her husband
since 1940. Prior to her husband's death in 1970, decedent was actively involved in the farm-
ing operation. Id. at 55-57.
260. Id. at 56.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 57-58.
263. Estate of Coon v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 602 (1983). See supra notes 171-98 and
accompanying text.
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Coffing,264 found that decedent had materially participated.266 The
court noted that the farming operation was entirely mechanized,
which was common in the area. 266 The court also noted that the ten-
ant picked his corn early and dried it with drying equipment he
owned.26" Decedent, who did not own such equipment, left the corn
in the field until the moisture content and market prices were best
for harvesting and sale. 68 The court emphasized this as evidence of
decedent's independent decision-making, supporting it with the fact
that decedent usually sold her portion of the crop immediately,
whereas the tenant sometimes stored his portion of the crop or sold it
on the futures market.26 This evidence of decision-making, coupled
with the decedent's residence on the farm and her frequent advice,
consultation, and inspections, and her assumption of financial re-
sponsibility, convinced the court that the material participation stan-
dard was satisfied.27° The court also emphasized that decedent con-
sulted with the tenant directly, rather than using a farm manager or
other agent.
2 7 1
Therefore, at this point we have the Tax Court in a series of
decisions insisting on a stricter standard under section 2032A than
under section 1402 and refusing to consider the Social Security Act
cases. The few decisions of other federal courts show no common
thread and appear to rest on the facts of each case.
3. Mangels v. United States.27 -For at least two reasons,
Mangels is probably the most important material participation case
decided. First, it is the first case decided by a court of appeals on
close facts. Second, and more important, it changed the analysis
used in determining material participation under section 2032A.
Therefore, a rather extensive recitation of the facts is appropriate.
Decedent, Luella Mangels, died in 1980. From 1966 until her
death, decedent was physically and mentally incapacitated and una-
ble to handle her own affairs. 73 She was a ward of a voluntary con-
servatorship. From 1974 until her death, Northwest Bank served as
264. Estate of Coffing v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1314 (1987). See supra
notes 241-57 and accompanying text.
265. Estate of Ward v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 54, 65 (1987).
266. Id. at 63.,
267. Id. at 64-65.
268. Id. at 56-57.
269. Id. at 64-65.
270. Estate of Ward v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 54, 65 (1987).
271. Id.
272. 828 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'g, 632 F. Supp. 1555 (S.D. Iowa 1986).
273. Id. at 1325.
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decedent's court-appointed conservator, with Lage, a vice-president
of the bank, performing all acts for the conservator relating to the
management of the farm.274 Neither decedent nor any member of
her family resided on the farm during the eight years preceding her
death. 75 The farm income was not reported as self-employment in-
come on decedent's tax returns because the conservator did not un-
derstand the "complex provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and
related regulations. 2 76 The farm was leased to two tenants who
were experienced farmers.277 All machinery and implements used on
the farm were furnished by tenants, but decedent, through the con-
servator, paid one-half of the cost of fertilizer, seed, pesticide, and
herbicide and the full cost of installing tile lines. 27 8 From 1974 until
1980, Mr. Lage's activities respecting the farm were:
1. Giving daily attention to farm market reports for about fif-
teen minutes a day.
2. Execution of futures contracts to market the decedent's share
of grain for about three and one-half hours a year. This was neces-
sary because the farm had no on-site storage facilities.
3. Physical inspection of the growing crop and farm ground for
fence and tile repairs once each quarter for about two hours each
inspection.
4. Contact with tenant once a month concerning progress of the
crop, cultivation, herbicide, and pesticide decisions lasting approxi-
mately one hour each consultation.
5. During the winter, counseling the tenant concerning crop de-
cisions for the next year and the next year's operating plans and op-
erating loan application for one and one-half to two hours.
6. Analyzing the cash equivalent rental of the crop-share pro-
ceeds to evaluate the advisability of renewal of the lease for about
four hours.
7. Undertaking extraordinary projects such as the construction
of drainage tile in 1979. This project occupied twenty to twenty-five
hours. 2
79
Almost all decisions regarding the operation of the farm were
274. Mangels v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 1555, 1556 (S.D. Iowa 1986), rev'd, 828
F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987).
275. Id. at 1555.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1559.
278. Id. at 1557, 1560.
279. Mangels v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 1555, 1556-57 (S.D. Iowa 1986), rev'd,
828 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987).
MATERIAL PARTICIPATION UNDER SECTION 2032A
made jointly by Mr. Lage and the tenants. 8 Major conservation
practice decisions, the marketing of the conservator's share of the
crop, and installation of tile lines were the exclusive responsibility of
the conservator. 81 Mr. Lage stated that though there were few dis-
agreements with the tenant as to operating decisions, the conservator
did override the tenant's suggestions on occasion.28 2
In a short opinion, the District Court held that the conservator's
activities did not constitute material participation, emphasizing that
the frequency of consultation with the tenant was low, the inspec-
tions did not take much time, and that no agent of the conservator
lived on the farm, did any physical work on the farm, or furnished
any machinery used in production. 283 The court stated: "In short, the
conservator's participation appears to have been no greater than that
of the landlord in the typical crop-share lease arrangement. That is
not enough to constitute 'material participation' under the
statute."" 4
The court of appeals reversed and remanded for entry of a judg-
ment in favor of the estate. 85 The court stated that the major fac-
tors in determining material participation were advising and consult-
ing with the tenant on the operation of the farm and participation in
a substantial number of final management decisions.28' The court
found that the monthly and annual conferences between the conser-
vator and the tenant and the joint decision-making process as to crop
patterns and rotation, fertilizer application, chemical, weed, and in-
sect control, fence repair, plowing and minimum tillage techniques,
seed purchasing, and crop planting and harvesting met these mini-
mum standards28 The court further noted that of the four other
factors listed in the section 2032A regulations, two were present in
this case.288 To the IRS's contention that the inspections were inade-
280. Id. at 1557.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1558.
283. Id. at 1559-60.
284. Mangels v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 1555, 1560 (S.D. Iowa 1986), rev'd, 828
F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987).
285. 828 F.2d 1324, 1325-26 (8th Cir. 1987).
286. Id. at 1327.
287. Id. at 1327-28.
288. Id. The four factors mentioned by the court are:
1. Regular inspection of production activities;
2. Advancement of funds and assumption of financial responsibility for a sub-
stantial portion of the farm's operating expense;
3. Furnishing of a substantial portion of the machinery, implements, and live-
stock; and
4. Maintenance of a principal residence on the farm.
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quate because they took only two hours each, the court responded
that the sufficiency of the inspections is to be measured against the
need for inspections; regularity does not necessarily mean time-con-
suming. 8 9 Here, since the inspections related to less than a quarter
section, the total time necessary was minimal.1 0 The court also ruled
that the failure to pay self-employment taxes on the farm income
was not fatal when the failure was explained and material participa-
tion is demonstrated.29'
Perhaps most importantly, the court of appeals repudiated the
district court's statement that the typical activities of a landlord
under a crop-share lease are insufficient to constitute material partic-
ipation, stating that the regulation requires no such comparison and
that to make such a comparison imposed a burden of proof "greater
than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute. 29 2 In a foot-
note, the court strongly implied that the cases under the Social Se-
curity Act would be relevant in determining material participation
under section 2032A.293
The court then ruled that acts of a conservator would be consid-
ered to be acts of the decedent for purposes of section 2032A.294 To
do otherwise, the court noted, would yield the "absurd conse-
quences" of discouraging creation of conservatorships-which should
be encouraged as in the best interests of the ward's estate-by im-
posing a higher estate tax for a person placed in a conservatorship.
295
The Mangels case is vitally important in the quest for a stan-
dard of material participation under section 2032A. The court
clearly stated that in order to materially participate, a decedent need
The court ruled that the first two factors were present in this case. Id. at 1328. See Treas.
Reg. § 20.2032A-3(e)(2) (1986).
289. 828 F.2d at 1328.
290. Mangels v. United States, 828 F.2d 1324, 1328 (8th Cir. 1987).
291. Id. The explanation was the failure of the conservator to understand the compli-
cated provisions of the Code. Id. at 1325. The estate also agreed to pay any tax due, together
with interest and penalties. Id. at 1328.
292. Id. at 1327.
293. The court's footnote stated:
Section 211 (a)(1) of the Social Security Act provides replacement income
to farm owners and tenants who materially participate in the production or man-
agement of production of agricultural or horticultural commodities. Although
case law interpreting that section is not necessarily applicable in analyzing
I.R.C. § 2032A, this court has determined that landlord participation beyond the
normal amount is an improper standard for determining material participation
under the Social Security Act. Foster v. Celebrezze, 313 F.2d 604, 607-08 (8th
Cir. 1963) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1327 n.7.
294. Id. at 1329-30.
295. Mangels v. United States, 828 F.2d 1324, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1987).
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not perform acts exceeding those of a landlord in a typical crop-
share lease. This is clearly consistent with the case law under the
Social Security Act previously discussed. And, although it was un-
necessary to determine the extent of the applicability of the Social
Security Act cases to section 2032A, the court's footnote clearly in-
dicates that the principles of these cases will be utilized to determine
material participation for the purposes of special use valuation.2 96
Indeed, in evaluating the facts of the Mangels case, the court used
the standards of the Social Security cases.297
4. Estate of Donahoe v. Commissioner.29 8 -The new mode of
analysis was immediately reflected in the Tax Court. Decedent's hus-
band (until his death in 1968), daughter (Brockman), son-in-law,
and grandchildren farmed the land owned by the decedent in a fam-
ily farm operation.2 9 During the relevant period, three of the tracts
were actively farmed by decedent's daughter, the daughter's hus-
band, and decedent's grandchildren.300 The fourth tract was used as
pasture for the family's beef cattle operation.30 For five of these
years, this tract was leased to a neighbor because there was not
enough cattle owned by the family to utilize all the pastureland of
this tract. The rental was for cash. 0 2 Under the lease, the daughter's
husband agreed to build new fences and replace old fences to protect
against damage to his property by the tenant's cattle.303 The lease,
which was oral, was expressly only for summers (May-June through
October-November).304 The plot was not used by anyone during the
winter months because there was no grass remaining on it.3°0 Dece-
dent's family pastured their cattle on the remainder of this tract and
used the cattle barn and storage barns on the tract for the family
farming operation. 0 6 Decedent resided in the house on that tract un-
til her death.30 7 During two of the years in question, decedent's
daughter, son-in-law, and grandchildren constructed new fences, re-
paired other fences, and monitored and repaired drain tiles on the
296. Id. at 1327 n.7.
297. See id. at 1326-30.
298. 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 271 (1988).




303. Estate of Donahoe v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 271, 272 (1988).
304. Id. at 272.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 273.
307. Id.
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entire tract."' 8
Noting that the statute was a relief measure, the court ruled
that the material participation standard was satisfied by use in the
winter months of the lease periods. 0 9 During these months, the te-
nants did not and could not use the property.310 The decedent's fam-
ily had exclusive control over the property, maintained a presence on
the property, and took care of the upkeep." Citing and discussing
Mangels extensively, the court ruled that by taking control of and
maintaining the land, building and repairing fences, mowing weeds,
putting in and monitoring drain tiles, and maintaining the land in a
satisfactory state, the decedent's family materially participated. 1 2
Decedent's son-in-law was on the tract, if not the specific acres, at
least once a week during both the winter and summer months, 13 and
decedent's family assumed the financial risk of any damage to the
property. 14 The court concluded:
In short, the Brockman's participation in the upkeep of the
farmland during the winter months was adequate to maintain
this land as farmland during the nonproducing, or in this case
nonproductive season. Thus, the Brockmans were materially in-
volved with the physical upkeep and management of the land
during the qualified winter months while the lessees had no con-
tact with the pasture land during these months in any way,
shape or form. We therefore do not agree with respondent's con-
tention that the activities on the property must be viewed in the
context of decedent's and Brockman's participation in the
lessee's cattle operation. The focus of this discussion is the mate-
rial participation of the decedent or the Brockmans in the winter
months because the summer months are not the "qualified pe-
riod" at issue.3 15
Comparing this case with the same court's discussion in Coon
reveals a startling transformation in analysis. Gone is the restrictive
tone. Gone is the emphasis on production activities. Gone is the em-
phasis on a restrictive interpretation. Emphasized is the relief nature
of the statute and the family farm operation. The influence of the
Mangels approach is clear. Donahoe indicates that future cases will
308. Estate of Donahoe v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 271, 273 (1988).
309. Id. at 273-74.
310. Id. at 275.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 274-75.
313. Estate of Donahoe v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 271, 275 (1988).
314. Id.
315. Id.
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be analyzed under a much more liberal and less restrictive standard.
VII. Conclusion
Section 2032A requires that material participation be deter-
mined "in a manner similar to the manner used for the purposes of
section 1402(a)." '' l The Internal Revenue Service, in an attempt to
limit the number of estates able to elect special use valuation, issued
regulations317 that appear to require a higher standard of activity
than the regulations under section 1402 and the cases decided under
the parallel section of the Social Security Act. The purpose of sec-
tion 2032A, as described in the congressional hearings and reports, is
ambiguous on this question. The early cases appear to adopt, at least
in part, the IRS position. The Mangels3 18 case, however, represents a
turning point in the interpretation process. The court in Mangels
clearly stated that material participation could be satisfied by the
activity required under the normal crop share lease.31 Mangels and
Sherrod3 20 emphasize a common sense interpretation of the statute
consistent with its purpose. This is exactly the approach taken by the
cases under the Social Security Act. Mangels strongly implies that
the Social Security Act cases are relevant to the interpretation of
material participation under section 2032A and will be regarded as
precedents in such cases.3"1 This analysis was used by the Tax Court
(which had decided Coon,322 the most important case prior to
Mangels) in Donahoe, 2 3 which represented a marked shift in the
analysis used by the Tax Court. The recent cases indicate that the
interpretation of material participation to be employed in future
cases under section 2032A will be the same as and rely on the Social
Security Act cases, except where to do so would violate the congres-
sional purpose of preserving the family farm. Such an interpretation
will conform to the congressional ideal, eliminate the problem of
whether the section 2032A regulations are void because they conflict
with the statute, and offer practitioners a clear guide to determine
316. I.R.C. § 2032A(e)6).
317. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-3 (1986).
318. Mangels v. United States, 828 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1987).
319. Id. at 1327.
320. Estate of Sherrod v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 523 (1984), rev'd on other grounds,
774 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1985).
321. Mangels v. United States, 828 F.2d 1324, 1327 n.7 (8th Cir. 1987).
322. Estate of Coon v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 602 (1983).
323. Estate of Donahoe v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 271 (1988).
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whether the leases they draw satisfy the material participation re-
quirement and whether the estates they handle will qualify for spe-
cial usevaluation.
